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Moral rules allow humans to cooperate by indirect reciprocity. Yet,
it is not clear which moral rules best implement indirect reciprocity and
are favoured by natural selection. Previous studies either considered only
public assessment, where individuals are deemed good or bad by all oth-
ers, or compared a subset of possible strategies. Here we fill this gap by
identifying which rules are evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) among all
possible moral rules while considering private assessment. We develop
an analytical model describing the frequency of long-term cooperation,
determining when a strategy can be invaded by another. We show that
there are numerous ESSs in absence of errors, which however cease to
exist when errors are present. We identify the underlying properties of
cooperative ESSs. Overall, this paper provides a first exhaustive evolu-
tionary invasion analysis of moral rules considering private assessment.
Moreover, this model is extendable to incorporate higher-order rules and
other processes.
Introduction1
Morality states which action can be considered good, which action is deemed2
to be rewarded and which action should be punished. Moral rules are pervasive3
in human societies. They can be observed in a range of examples from the4
behaviours of eight month-old infants [1] to the moral norms of societies [2].5
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The pervasiveness of these rules could be explained by their capacity to create6
cooperation by indirect reciprocity [3]. Indirect reciprocity describes a form of7
reciprocity where the action of an individual is reciprocated by a third party in8
future interactions. In its simplest form, cooperators get rewarded by receiving9
future cooperation, and defectors get punished by future defection [4]. Indirect10
reciprocity can be beneficial as it is one of the few mechanisms that can create11
cooperation [3, 5, 6] even when the interactions are not repeated or between12
related individuals.13
Indirect reciprocity explains well the emergence of moral rules but it is not14
clear which moral rules best implement indirect reciprocity, and thus, which15
moral rules should be observed in the real world. The number of possible rules16
can quickly become staggering. When individuals judge the action of another,17
they can take into account not only the action observed, but also the reputation18
of the individuals involved in the interaction. For instance, helping someone is19
generally seen as a positive action, but helping a criminal can be deemed bad.20
Do individuals use only a few rules among all the possible rules, or do a wide21
variety of rules coexist? Are there features common to all these rules and if yes,22
what are they? For instance, ones could expect that successful rules are simple23
ones as observed in direct reciprocity [7, 8], while others argued that rules could24
be so complex that it drove the evolution of larger brains [9].25
Tackling this problem, previous works have compared the evolutionary suc-26
cess of a large number of rules. Their results show that only few strategies27
stand out in term of evolutionary success and the frequency of cooperation28
they enforce [4, 10, 11]. These previous works have been a major contribution29
but its conclusions are limited. First, they did not consider the evolution of30
different assessment rules, i.e. how an individual is judged. Assessment rules31
were fixed in a group by moral norms, and all individuals within a group judge32
someone else actions in the same way. Although individuals within a group can33
share moral rules because they conform to common norms, evidence suggests34
that moral rules are also strongly determined by individual characteristics and35
thus, can differ between individuals. For instance, infants [12, 13] and toddlers,36
which were almost not exposed to social norms, already exhibit signs of indirect37
reciprocity [14, 15]. Second, these previous models consider that the opinions38
and assessments are public. This means that individuals are considered either39
exclusively good or exclusively bad by all others at a given time. Yet, in the40
real world, individuals can disagree in their judgements because they have dif-41
ferent moral rules or because they get contradictory information. For instance,42
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hunter-gatherers exhibit reciprocity and moral [16] , but often disagree on who43
exhibit these moral values [17].44
The limits of the assumption of public assessment are well acknowledged but45
models considering private assessment have been limited by analytical complex-46
ity. Indeed, disagreement between individual opinions can itself result in future47
interactions being judged differently by the actor and an observer, fuelling more48
disagreement. As a result, previous work that considered private assessment or49
individual assessment rules limited their analysis to a small set of strategies,50
usually the ones that have been shown successful in models with public assess-51
ment [18–21]. Recently, [22] developed a model to explore the success of a large52
number of assessment rules against strategies that always cooperate or defect53
[23]. Yet, an exhaustive study which confronts all possible rules with each other54
is still missing.55
In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by identifying the evolutionary stable56
strategies among all possible moral rules. The contributions of this paper are57
two-fold. First, we provide the first exhaustive evolutionary invasion analysis of58
moral rules considering private assessment. We show that few moral rules stand59
out and we identify the common features of these rules. Second, we provide a60
model which describes the dynamics of opinions and provide the frequency of61
cooperation of an individual given its strategy with private assessment. This62
model can be extended to incorporate higher order rules and other processes,63
e.g. communication [24].64
Model description65
The model describes a well-mixed and infinitely large population of individuals66
that play a one-shot dyadic donation game. In this game, a randomly chosen67
individual called ’donor’ decides whether to cooperate with another randomly68
chosen individual called ’recipient’. If the donor cooperates, it pays a cost c to69
provide a benefit b to the receiver, while if it defects nothing happens. This70
game is a social dilemma as we consider b > c, because all would benefit if all71
individuals donated, but individuals are not willing to pay the cost.72
Individuals hold private opinions on each other individual except themselves.73
Opinions are either 1 or 0, i.e. good or bad. Individuals use these opinions to74
apply their strategies. A strategy consists of a set of action rules, A, and two75
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where ai, cij , dij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i, j ∈ {0, 1}. The action rules determine how the77
individual will behave when it is chosen as a donor and meets a recipient it78
thinks to be good (a1) or bad (a0). For example, a1 = 1 means to cooperate79
with someone good and a0 = 0 to defect with someone bad. The assessment80
rules determine how the individual updates its opinions when it observes an81
interaction between two other players. The action of the donor and the current82
opinions of the observing individual (toward the two observed players) are con-83
sidered. For example, the rule c10 = 1 means that a good donor cooperating84
with a bad recipient is regarded as good afterwards. Assessment rules are di-85
vided into two here for simplicity (C applies to the case where donor cooperates86
and D applies to the case where donor defects). The opinion about the recipi-87
ent is not updated. Errors may occur during assessment or while implementing88
an action. Following literature [25], we consider (i) execution errors, at a rate89
µe, where an individual does the opposite of what it intended (i.e. determined90
by her strategy) and (ii) assessment errors, at a rate µa, where an individual91
assigns the opposite opinion of what her assessment rules would suggest.92
A large number of strategies are possible, and each strategy can differ in its93
evolutionary success. We want to compute the evolutionary success of different94
strategies and see if particular strategies stand out. Our method consists in95
deriving the long-run average proportion of good opinions others have on an96
individual, i.e. the individual’s h-score. We use this h-score to calculate the97
frequency of cooperation from and towards this individual which determinate98
its fitness. We apply this method to compare the h-score and the fitness of99
individuals in a population with a resident strategy and a single mutant strategy100




We confirm that the analytical model correctly approximates the h-score and104
the probability of cooperation at equilibrium, by comparing the predictions of105
the analytical model with agent-based simulations for any possible strategies in106
a monomorphic population. Some pairs of strategies are equivalent (as formally107
defined in the mirror image section of the extended method). They simply assess108
and act upon opinions in an opposite way (what one would call good is called109
bad by the other). After keeping one instance of each pair, we are left with 258110
strategies including 256 discriminator strategies, unconditional cooperator and111
unconditional defector. The simulations implement the aforementioned model112
with a population of 100 individuals and one observer per interaction. The113
results of the simulations are taken after 4×105 interactions, and averaged over114
105 interactions and 30 independent replicates. We run analysis considering115
that (i) the error rate is negligible and (ii) the error rate is not negligible. In116
the former, we consider that the error rate is equal to 0 in the analytical model117
and we keep a very low error rate in simulation (namely, 10−4). In the latter,118
we do not vary independently the execution and assessment error rates because119
we are interested in testing the robustness of the conclusion obtained from the120
model without errors, rather than describing the effect of a particular type of121
error.122
The results show that the analytical model well approximates the h-score123
and the probability of cooperation at equilibrium. The mean difference between124
the h-score predicted and simulated is 0.014 in absence of error and 0.005 in125
presence of error. The mean difference between the frequency of cooperation126
predicted and simulated is 0.01 in absence of error and 0.0009 in presence of127
error. The detailed results are provided in SI. The results of the simulations128
are illustrated in supplementary Figure S1 and summarised in supplementary129
Figure S2.130
Evolutionary invasion analysis131
We now use the analytical model to conduct an evolutionary invasion analysis (in132
short, ESS analysis). As common assumptions in ESS analysis [26], we assume133
that i) mutations are rare and thus, there is at most one mutant strategy m at134
a time in a population of individuals with resident strategy r, ii) the mutant’s135
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Figure 1: Number of ESS as a function of the benefit to cost ratio, b/c. The
colour represents the probability of cooperation between residents. The results
are presented for different initial h-scores h(t0) (0.1, 0.5 and 0.9, in top, middle
and bottom rows, respectively).
effect is negligible on the dynamics and iii) population size is large enough so that136
stochasticity in selection is negligible. To know if a strategy can be invaded or137
not by another, we compute the difference of absolute fitness between a mutant138
strategy in a population of resident strategy. If the fitness of the mutant is lower139
or strictly equal, the mutant disappears and the resident resists invasion. If a140
strategy resists invasion from all other possible strategies, it is an ESS. Unlike141
the previous section, fitness and h-score are now directly computed rather than142
simulated. We consider that any differences in fitness less than 10−4 are equal143
to 0 because of the floating point error.144
In absence of errors145
First, we consider that the errors are negligible, that is µa = 0 and µe = 0.146
Figure 1 shows that there are multiple evolutionary stable strategies (ESS),147
that is strategies that can not be invaded by others. Supplementary Figure S3148
shows that some strategies are not ESS for all studied initial h-score h(t0). We149
focus on strategies that are ESS for all three initial h-scores.150
The ESS can be divided in two groups, strategies which cooperate and avoid151
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Name a1 a0 c11 c10 c01 c00 d11 d10 d01 d00
Minimum ratio
benefit on cost
C-1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
C-2 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
C-3 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
C-4 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
C-5 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 2
C-6 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 2
C-7 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 2
C-8 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 2
C-9 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 2
C-10 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 2
C-11 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 2
C-12 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1/(1-h(t0))
C-13 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1/(1-h(t0))
C-14 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1/(1-h(t0))
C-15 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1/(1-h(t0))
Figure 2: List of strategies that are cooperators and ESS for any initial h-score
and at least one value of the benefit to cost ratio, b/c. The last column represents
the minimum ratio for which the strategy is ESS for any initial h-score.
exploitation, and those which defect and efficiently exploit others. There are152
strategies that have an intermediary probability of cooperation but they are153
only ESS for a specific benefit to cost ratio so we do not discuss them further154
here. We present the 15 strategies that are ESS and cooperators in Figure 2,155
with the minimum benefit to cost ratio required for a strategy to be an ESS. We156
present the 38 strategies that are defectors in supplementary Figure S4, with157
the maximum benefit to cost ratio required for a strategy to be ESS. We call158
the ESS cooperator and defector strategies respectively C-* and D-*. We name159
each ESS cooperator, with C1 representing the first ESS cooperator in the table,160
C2 the second, and so on.161
First, we look closely at the ESS cooperators. In term of behaviours, a162
distinctive feature of the ESS cooperators is that they fully cooperate with each163
other while cooperating less with mutant defectors. By cooperating with each164
other, they sustain the highest possible fitness for cooperators. By cooperating165
less with mutant defectors, they limit the fitness of the mutant to be less than or166
equal to their fitness, providing that the benefit of cooperation is high enough.167
First, all the ESS cooperators have c11 = 1 and c10 = 1. It means that they168
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Figure 3: Differential equation of h-score of resident on mutant for the three
types of ESS cooperators when mutant is always defect (AllD). From left to
right, strategies that are ESS for a ratio of 1, 2 and 11−h(t0) .
consider that cooperation from an individual seen as good is always rewarded169
by future cooperation. Ultimately, this results in a population of individuals170
which see each other as good and always cooperate with each other. This allows171
the strategies to maintain cooperation once established.172
Second, the ESS cooperators have either d11 = 0 or d01 = 0, or both. This173
means that they will consider individuals defecting towards good individuals as174
(partly or totally) bad. Because the ESS cooperators consider each other as175
good once h-score of 1 is reached, this allows ESS cooperators to defect with176
individuals that defect with them. ESS cooperators differ in their capacity177
to efficiently reciprocate defection. First, there are strategies that have both178
d11 = 0 and d01 = 0. They are ESS on the whole range of benefit to cost ratios179
(C1-C4). It is because they have an average opinion of 0 on defectors, and thus180
will always defect with them, as shown in the left panel of Figure 3. Second,181
there are strategies that have both d11 = 0 and d01 = 1, which are ESS if the182
benefit is at least twice larger than the cost (C5-11). These strategies have half183
of the time good opinion (and cooperating) with mutant defectors, and half184
of the time bad opinion (and defecting) with mutant defectors. Finally, there185
are strategies which have d11 = 1 and d01 = 0 (C12-15) and for which their186
evolutionary stability depends of the initial h-score. For instance, they are ESS187
for a ratio b/c > 10 if the initial h-score is 0.9 or ESS for a ratio b/c > 2 if the188
initial h-score is 0.5. These strategies have in common that their opinions of189
mutant defecting with good individuals remain roughly the same. For instance,190
one strategy gives 0 to bad individuals defecting and gives 1 to good individuals191
defecting. Thus, the frequency of cooperation received by mutant defectors is192
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approximately the initial h-score h(t0) and their fitness h(t0)b. Strategies C12-193
15 can not be invaded by a defector when their fitness b − c > h(t0)b. This194
equation can be rearranged, leading to b/c > 1/(1− h(t0)).195
To summarise, the rules of ESS cooperators make them efficiently reciprocate196
once cooperation is fully established. The first pattern maintains cooperation197
while the second makes them defect with mutant defectors. Yet, this does not198
assure that they reach cooperation in the first place. For that, we can observe199
that ESS cooperators, besides c11 = 1 and c10 = 1, judge a number of other200
encounters as good. This number and the type of encounters can vary but they201
judge enough cases as good so that the h-score of an individual with a resident202
strategy seen by other individuals with the same strategy, increases towards 1203
(the differential equation is always positive). This ensures that they go towards204
full cooperation even in presence of initial disagreement. For instance, the first205
three strategies (C1-C3) consider that cooperating is good and at least one other206
case as good. Because these strategies cooperate with a probability h, it ensures207
that the differential equation is always positive h + p(d?0) − h ≥ 0. Another208
example is C4, which might appear surprising as they consider one cooperation209
as bad c00 = 0. However, this case is very rare and it leads to the differential210
equation remaining positive.211
In short, the strategies that are evolutionary stable and cooperators have212
rules that (i) establish full cooperation with each other, (ii) sustain full coop-213
eration when established, and (iii) reduce the frequency of cooperation with214
mutant defectors. Note that the presence of a single of these features in a215
strategy does not mean that the strategy will be ESS. Indeed, we looked at the216
common patterns among the ESS rather than correlating the rules with the suc-217
cess of strategies. Finally, we observe a diversity of rules because first, strategies218
can differ in their capacity to defect with defectors, and second, different rules219
can lead a population to full cooperation on the long term.220
We now look at defector strategies that are ESS. Again, there are numerous221
strategies fulfilling these conditions but they have similar behaviour. Their222
distinctive feature is that they have a lower probability to cooperate with the223
mutant, than the mutant have with the resident. The rules have in common224
the pattern that d10 = d00 = 0. In other words, they always defect with225
individuals defecting with individuals they see as bad. This allows them to avoid226
cooperation when individuals do not cooperate with them. Again, defectors can227
be separated into different types as a function of the maximum ratio of benefit228
to cost required for them to be ESS. First, the defectors that are ESS for the229
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whole range of benefit studied (D1 - D16) never cooperate with each other nor230
with the mutant. They are behaviourally equivalent to strategies that always231
defect. This means that they do not pay any cost and thus no strategies can232
have a higher fitness than them. They also all have in common that c10 = c00 =233
0. This means that any strategy interacting with them (that they consider234
as bad) will be considered bad, and receive future defection. Second, some235
defectors are ESS only for a very limited range of the benefit to cost ratio.236
These strategies cooperate with mutant, but at a lesser rate than mutant with237
resident. This means that mutant can invade if the benefit they received by238
cooperation outweighs the cost of their cooperation. Without going into the239
details, these strategies do not have the rules of c10 = c00 = 0 as previous240
strategies, and thus are not perfect defectors.241
We notice that there are a large number of cases of polymorphism among242
these strategies. In the cases where these strategies can be invaded, there are243
between 75.5% to 88.4% of cases with polymorphism against 5% to 17% when244
looking at any strategies. The reason is that if the benefit that mutant provides245
to resident is negligible when mutant are a minority, it is not the case anymore246
when they compose most of the population. Thus, defector strategies that are247
ESS for only a limited set of the benefit to cost ratios could still be frequent for248
other ratios.249
In presence of errors250
When the errors are not negligible, the previously identified ESS are not evo-251
lutionary stable anymore except for always defect (AllD). This is because the252
errors in assessment lead discriminating cooperators to cooperate less, and dis-253
criminating defectors to defect less. For instance, the previously ESS cooper-254
ators maintain a lower level of cooperation between each other (and thus are255
easier to invade). In addition, the errors create disagreement and can have an256
effect on the long term. As a result, C-* can cooperate more with mutant than257
with themselves, even when mutant are strong cooperators e.g. judge good258
all except d00. This is because the cooperation of such strategy breaks down259
only in specific cases, which allow them to quickly get their h-score back to260
1. AllD is still an ESS even if it sometimes cooperates by mistake, because it261
is not affected by assessment errors and thus has still the lowest frequency of262
cooperation possible.263
To gain further insights, we look at the difference of fitness between mutant264
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Figure 4: Difference of fitness between mutant and resident wm−wr, for different
strategies that are ESS when there are no errors. We differentiate between
strategies that were cooperators, defectors and the strategy that always defect
(AllD), which is the only ESS in presence of errors. The results are presented
for a high benefit to cost ratio (b/c = 20) to highlight the difference of fitness.
Results for other, smaller benefit to cost ratios, can be found in supplementary
figures S5 and S6, showing the same trend.
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and resident for different resident strategies. This difference of fitness gives us265
hints on the success of strategies when evolution is stochastic, that is when in-266
vasion is a probability based on the difference of fitness. We show the results267
for a high benefit to cost ratio in Figure 4 and for other ratios in supplementary268
Figures S5 and S6. First, Figure 4 shows that in absence of error, ESS coop-269
erators have a higher difference of fitness as the benefit increases. This result270
suggests that ESS cooperators could be more prevalent than ESS defectors when271
selection is weak and if the benefit of cooperation is sufficiently high. Second,272
Figure 4 shows the same (but weaker) trend when errors are not negligible. In273
particular, the difference of fitness is higher for C15 than the only ESS with274
error: always defect against the majority of mutants. This suggests that if in275
presence of errors, C15 is not ESS anymore, it could still be a very frequent276
strategy (and more frequent than always defect).277
Discussion278
Among the large number of possible moral rules, previous work shows that only279
a few of them stand out and should be observed in the real world [11]. Yet,280
models studying the evolution of moral rules considered either public assessment281
or a limited number of strategies and it still lacks of an exhaustive evolutionary282
analysis of moral rules with private assessment. In this paper, we fill this gap283
by building an analytical model to describe the change in opinions as a function284
of time. We used this model to study the invasibility of any strategies by any285
other strategies up to third-order assessment rules, and identify the evolutionary286
stable strategies.287
Previous results suggested that considering private information breaks down288
cooperation and limits the evolution of cooperative moral rules by creating289
disagreement [27]. However, our results show that there are evolutionary stable290
rules implementing cooperation even when assessment is private. This result is291
explained by the fact that some rules are capable to suppress disagreement on292
the long term. Second, our results show that the number of ESS in our study293
can even be higher than the number of ESS previously found when considering294
public information [11]. This is because multiple rules can end up implementing295
the same level of cooperation on the long term. For instance, strategies C-1 and296
C-3 differ in their rules about good individuals defecting with bad individuals297
(d10) but they still end up with full cooperation at equilibrium. Note that these298
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Table 1: Presentation of the main strategies identified in the literature, i.e.
image scoring, standing strategy and the leading eight; and the ESS cooperators
identified in our analysis C1-15. * mark wildcards. Note that all C1-15 have
an additional restriction: p(o, r, r) > hr,r̄ , which ensures that the h-score hr,r̄
increases up to 1 (see Equation 4). This means that a maximum of one of
the wildcards can be equal to 0 for C1-4 and C12-15, and a maximum of two
wildcards can be equal to 0 for C5-11.
c11 c10 c01 c00 d11 d10 d01 d00
Image scoring 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Standing strategy 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
Leading 1-8 1 * 1 * 0 1 0 *
C1-4 1 1 1 * 0 * 0 *
C5-11 1 1 1 * 0 * 1 *
C12-15 1 1 0 * 1 * 0 *
conclusions rely on the assumption that interactions are long enough so that299
initial disagreement is negligible. When interactions are shorter, it is likely that300
other mechanisms are required for indirect reciprocity to evolve such as empathy301
[20] or public institutions [21].302
Second, we identify the important properties of the rules that are ESS and303
cooperators. These strategies consider (i) good cooperators as good, (ii) all or a304
part of defectors towards good individuals as bad, and (iii) a varying number of305
other cases as good. The last rule allows the strategy to converge toward a full306
population of good cooperators, and the first two rules allow them to efficiently307
reciprocate once good reputation is established.308
How do these successful rules compare to rules previously identified in the309
literature? To answer this question, we present the main rules in the compar-310
ative Table 1. A significant part of previous work has focused on two famous311
strategies, image scoring [4], that is cooperate with cooperators and defect with312
defectors, and standing [10, 28], that is cooperate with cooperators, cooperate313
with defectors towards defectors and defect with defector towards cooperators314
(see Table 1). Image scoring was historically one of the first strategies to suc-315
cessfully implement indirect reciprocity [4], but later work showed that standing316
is more evolutionary successful [10]. Our results concur as we found the stand-317
ing strategy to be evolutionary stable for any benefit superior to cost (standing318
strategy is C1), while image scoring is not an ESS. Note that image scoring319
would be an ESS if initial h-score is exactly 1.320
In addition, our results show that the important rules of the standing strat-321
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egy are ”cooperate with good cooperators” and ”defect with defectors against322
good”, and that the part ”cooperate with defectors against bad” can vary. This323
distinction provides important new insights into the ongoing debate. Indeed,324
some experimental evidence supports the presence of standing strategy in nat-325
ural populations [29] while others [30] appear to be against. In laboratory326
experiments [30], researchers compared the amount of defection received by an327
unconditional defectors and a ”justified” defectors, that is individuals that de-328
fect with previous defectors. Their results showed that the difference is not329
strong enough to support standing strategy. As pointed out [10], these conclu-330
sions could be limited as they do not measure the amount of defection received331
by individuals that refuse to help previous donors. Our results show rigorously332
here that it is this amount of defection towards defectors against good indi-333
viduals that matters for the success of the standing strategy rather than the334
cooperation toward justified defectors as measured in the experiments. Thus,335
our results suggest that further experiments with different measures is required336
to reject or accept the prevalence of standing strategy.337
Our work also follows the exhaustive evolutionary analysis which showed338
eight successful strategies (called leading eight [11]). A direct comparison of the339
leading eight and the ESS described here is limited because this previous study340
focused on the evolutionary success of different action rules, i.e. what is the best341
action rule for a given assessment rule, while the model presented here focuses342
on assessment rules, i.e. how to judge someone. Yet, it can shed light on main343
differences between private and public assessment. First, the C-* strategies344
require that c10 = 1, a rule which is shared by only half of the leading eight.345
This rule is crucial with private assessment to avoid cooperators loosing their346
good standing. Those leading eight strategies which do not share this rule were347
shown to suffer greatly by private assessments before [27]. Second, C*- rules348
also require that enough cases are considered good so that the full population349
converge towards being good cooperators. On the other side, C-* rules can vary350
in cases where leading eight can not. For instance, the leading eights always351
consider defection towards a good individual as bad. This is shared by the most352
successful strategies found here. However, the C-* strategies can also consider353
defection in one situation (d11 or d01) as good and still be ESS given that the354
benefit of cooperation is high enough. This is because such a rule in public355
assessment would lead to all individuals cooperating with defectors while this356
happens partially with private assessment.357
Third, we find that the presence of errors breaks down the evolutionary358
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stability of the previously identified strategies. This is because the property of359
these rules that allow them to converge toward full cooperation, also makes them360
vulnerable to errors. This result suggests that private assessment rules could361
not evolve when errors are frequent, and that public assessment for instance362
supported by an institution could be preferred in this case [21]. However, this363
result is mitigated by two points. First, we have considered that any difference364
of fitness, however small, leads to invasion or not. This is a classic assumption365
of ESS analyses but in the real world, selection can be weaker and stochasticity366
can result in non-ESS to be frequent. Important first steps have been made367
by a recent paper which considered stochastic evolution of a population mixing368
one discriminator strategy, with unconditional cooperators and defectors [22].369
An extension could consider a population of different discriminator strategies370
in co-presence. Second, the effect of errors could be suppressed by additional371
mechanisms. Evidence shows that not only the outcome of an action plays a372
role in assessments but also the intention behind this action [31, 32], and thus373
errors in actions could have a limited effect. Another example is the role of374
communication and conformity which could counterbalanced the effect of errors375
and drive the h-score towards a general agreement. Further work integrating376
these mechanisms would provide a more realistic model and test if the strategies377
identified here could be frequent in presence of errors.378
Results from models of indirect reciprocity can be confronted to the donor379
game conducted in laboratory experiments. For instance, experiments con-380
ducted by [33] showed that information about the partners’ previous partners’381
reputation increases the level of cooperation. This is in agreement with our382
results that all the C-* use second-order information. Second, recent exper-383
iments have studied the strategies employed by individuals [34]. They show384
that individuals often requested second-order information, and at a higher fre-385
quency when their partner has previously defected. We find some similarity in386
our results. All the C-* require to know the past interactions of their partner387
to judge its action when the partner defected, while only eight strategies re-388
quire this information when the partner cooperated. This goes to 3 against 1389
if we considered the most successful strategies C1-4. Last but not least, they390
showed a strong variation in behavioural strategies. This is in line with ours391
results, which show that diverse behavioural strategies can be employed. How-392
ever, these comparisons are limited as our model considers a large group size393
and long interactions, which are both assumptions often absent in laboratory394
experiments. A more promising path to test our results would be in study in395
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natural populations.396
We have made a number of assumptions in this model that need to be397
discussed. First, we approximated the reputation dynamics by a deterministic398
approach. This required two main assumptions, that the size of the population is399
infinitely large and that the number of observers is finite. The first assumption400
means that the results in this paper are applicable only to cases where the401
population is sufficiently large. The second assumption results naturally from402
physical limits of the number of observers, e.g. it is likely that an increase of403
ten fold of group size does not mean an increase of ten fold of the number of404
observers. However, it is important to note that there are possible exceptions, in405
particular systems where actions are widely shared e.g. e-commerce or medieval406
merchant guilds [35].407
Second,we have considered that the initial h-scores are the same for all indi-408
viduals, including the resident and mutant strategies. In real world, the opinion409
of an individual on a newly met individual could be part of the individual strat-410
egy (in the same way that tit-for-tat could play cooperate or defect at the first411
round). We did not consider this here to keep the number of strategies reason-412
able and we focused on the strategies that are ESS for diverse initial h-scores.413
Future work could integrate the initial h-score in the strategy and replicate the414
evolutionary analysis.415
To conclude, the contribution of this paper is two fold. First, it provides a416
first exhaustive evolutionary analysis of moral rules with private assessment. It417
provides more realistic results, as a large number of real-world situations (in-418
cluding most of laboratory experiments) includes private assessment. Second, it419
provides an analytical model that describes the opinion dynamics when assess-420
ment is private and allows further investigation of the issue accurately and at421
a faster speed than with simulations, enabling exhaustive analyses. The model422
can easily be extended to integrate other mechanisms. A natural progression423
of this work is (i) to study strategies up to second-order action rules where424
action also depends of actor’s reputation to compare results with the previous425
exhaustive evolutionary analysis with public assessment [11], and (ii) integrate426
the effect of communication and conformity [36] as it plays a prevalent role in427
indirect reciprocity [24] and can be easily integrated in the model [37].428
16
Method429
We build a deterministic model that approximates the average fitness of an430
individual of a given strategy. We first consider a monomorphic population431
where all individuals have the same resident strategy. We do so to introduce432
the method in its simplest form. We consider that the number of interactions433
is large enough, and thus, the fitness w∗i of a focal individual i is its average434






(bp∗(ci,r)− cp∗(cr,i)) . (2)
The fitness of an individual i is the benefit b received when other individuals436
cooperate with the individual i, discounted by the cost c paid when the focal437
individual i cooperates. The probability that an individual r cooperates with438
individual i is denoted by p(ci,r). The superscript
∗ denotes that the fitness439
and probability of cooperation considered are at equilibrium. This probability440
itself depends on the many opinions that individuals have on each other, which441
is difficult to track analytically. Instead of describing all the opinions, we define442
a h-score of an individual i as the proportion of other individuals with opinion443
1 on i, or the average reputation of i.444
The h-score is useful because considering that the number of individuals is445
large enough and that the donor, recipient and observers are chosen randomly,446
the h-score also describes the probability that a random individual has an opin-447
ion of 1 on the focal individual i, that is hi,r = p(oir = 1). Thus, we can combine448
h-score and the action rules which describe how individuals act upon a given449
encounter, to describe the probability of cooperation:450
p∗(ci,r) = hi,ra1 + (1− hi,r)a0. (3)
Similarly, using the assessment rules, we can calculate the probability that h-451
score increases or decreases after an interaction p(or,r,r), and thus, the dynamics452
of h-score over time. The formula is given in Equation 9 in the detailed method453
in SI. Execution and assessment errors modify respectively the probability of454
cooperation or the probability of h-score to increase or decrease after an inter-455
action as described in the equations 12 and 13 of the extended method section456
(SI).457
So far, we derived the change in h-score for an individual with a given strat-458
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egy but we would like to derive the change in h-score for any individuals. Let459
us note that because individuals have the same strategy, the direction of change460
is similar across individuals and their h-score will converge towards the same461
equilibrium points. In addition, we make the assumption that the number of462
observers is small and independent of the population size. We also assume that463
the initial h-score of all individuals are the same. Following these two assump-464
tions, the differences in h-score between individuals due to stochasticity is small465
and negligible on the dynamics. Because the change in h-score is very small af-466
ter an interaction, it can be approximated by the following differential equation467
[38] (see details in SI)468
d(hr,r)
dt
= p(or,r,r)− hr,r. (4)
The average h-score at equilibrium can be found by solving the equation
d(hr,r)
dt =469
0. This equation is a polynomial of hr,r of a maximum degree of three (see Equa-470
tions 19 to 22 in SI). The stability of equilibrium points is determined by looking471
at the sign of the derivative at the equilibrium points [26].472
We now extend the analytical model to conduct an evolutionary invasion473
analysis (in short, ESS analysis). To know if a strategy can be invaded or474
not by another, we need to compute the difference of absolute fitness between a475
mutant strategy in a population of resident strategy. If the fitness of the mutant476
is greater than that of the resident, the mutant invades the population and477
becomes resident. If the fitness of the mutant is lower, the mutant disappears478
and the resident resists invasion. When the two values of fitness are equal, the479
resident also resists invasion because in an infinitely large population, a mutant480
strategy can not invade by drift. If two strategies can mutually invade, there481
will be polymorphism.482
The difference of fitness between a mutant wm and a resident wr is given as483
follows:484
∆w = wm − wr = p∗(cm,r)b− p∗(cr,m)c− p∗(cr,r)(b− c). (5)
The fitness of the mutant is the benefit received when a resident cooperates with485
the mutant discounted by the cost of the cooperation from mutant to resident.486
There are three different probabilities of cooperation. The probability of coop-487
eration between residents p(cr,r) is calculated as in the case of a monomorphic488
population. The two remaining probabilities of cooperation can be computed as489
previously using h-score and action rules (Equation 15 in SI). To find the prob-490
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The probabilities of h-score to increase after the observation of an interaction,493
p(o), can be described using the h-score and the assessment rules as previously494
(Equation 17 in SI). This system of two polynomial equations with two un-495
knowns are solved numerically. To determinate the stability of the equilibrium496
points, we look at the Jacobian matrix at the equilibrium of interest. The equi-497
librium is locally stable if the real part of the leading eigenvalue is negative498
[26]. Errors are integrated in the same way as in the case of monomorphic499
populations.500
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